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Mikenberg, da Costa and Chuaqui [1] introduce а formal 
defiпition of pragmatic truth, later called quasi-truth Ьу da Costa. 
This concept can Ье considered as а generalization for partial 
contexts of Tarski 's correspondence characterization of truth. In 
this talk, based on models, Ьу defiпing the mathematical concepts 
of partial relation and partial structure ( that extend the concepts 
of relation and strнcture respectively), we will present the formal 
definition of quasi-truth. Ву нsing а special semantic approach, 
we will present an appropriate logic that can Ье used as the 
uнderlying logic for theories whose truth conception is da Costa's 
quasi-trнtl1. А Kripke model semantics can Ье delineated for this 
logic and amoпg some fundamental results we have that it is а 
kind of discussive paraconsistent modal logic. The three major 
interpretations of the нotion of truth - the correspondence, the 
coherence and tl1e pragmatic accounts - can Ье put together in 
the formal framework we have delineated. Finally, we argue that 
the concept of quasi-truth offers а way of accommodating the 
incompleteness inherent to scientific representations and can Ье 
considered as the truth conception inherent to scientific theories . 
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